THE POLITICAL SITUATION
Political developments since independence have basically flowed along the channels laid down in the Lancaster House agreement although there have been some new features.
Formally speaking, the Lancaster House agreement established in Zimbabwe a parliamentary democracy based on universal franchise (though with the concessions to the whites in terms of reserved white seats).
At the same time there was an ‘Africanisation’ of the state machinery, through the phasing out of the old white personnel—to be replaced basically by the educated black strata who sat out the guerilla war in overseas universities.
But in practice, the most important development that has taken place since independence is the diminishing role of parliament, and the increasing concentration of power in the hands of Ministers, etc, and above all in the hands of Mugabe.
This is a result of the gulf between the objective interests the regime serves and the political base it has to try to sustain among the workers and peasants.
The Lancaster House agreement laid the basis for the promotion of the black middle class to positions in the state as junior partners with imperialism. In exchange they agreed to preserve the productive foundations of private ownership: on the land and in the factories, mines, and banks.
The foreign ownership of the means of production which amounts to two-thirds of all capital was not to be tampered with.
These conditions were spelt out in the cold constitutional language of the Lancaster House agreement. But the only political force with the base of social support which could carry them out in practice was the radical nationalist leadership, whose popularity rested on the fact that it had led the guerilla struggle for power, and had been invested by the peasants, youth and workers with their hopes for achieving a decent life.
The regime is buffeted on the one hand by foreign and local capitalists, determined to sustain their interests, and on the other hand by the uneasy conglomeration of petty-bourgeois, peasant, and working-class interests which are its base of support. In a relatively underdeveloped economy beset by the world capitalist crisis it can satisfy neither the capitalists nor the mass of working people.
It is this which explains both the zig-zagging course of policy and rhetoric, and the tendency for the regime to elevate itself above any democratic process and concentrate power in executive hands — a process which will be taken further with the establishment of a ‘one-party state’. This kind of regime, zig-zagging, elevated above the masses, balancing between contending classes neither of which is able to establish its clear supremacy— but based on a capitalist state machine and defending capitalism—is what Marxism refers to as bourgeois Bonapartism.
When the middle-class leadership attacks imperialism—for example, protesting against low prices of raw materials, the growing foreign debts, the lack of real aid, the undermining of an indigenous black capitalist class, and imperialism’s support for racism in South Africa—they pretend that they are ‘at one’ with the masses, and putting forward the position of the workers and rural poor.
But they do not explain that these problems cannot be solved within the framework of capitalism, or mobilise a struggle headed by the working class to break with capitalism.
ln reality, the middle-class leadership is engaged merely in a struggle with the imperialists over the spoils of the wealth produced by the working class. Without being able to satisfy the demands of the workers, youth, and peasants—or even of the whole of the middle class— they are trying to sustain the support of the masses in a battle over the surplus in order to enrich themselves first and foremost.
Thus they are forced on the one hand to turn to state control and suppression of the very classes to which they look for support. On the other hand, because of their impotence against imperialism, they fight among themselves for the crumbs which fall off the table of capitalism. The splits take place along regional and tribal lines, with a festering of corruption, favouritism, and patronage.
It is this volatile mixture of favouritism and repression which has forced tribal and regional factions to form among the Shona petty bourgeois leaders who head ZANU(PF). The growing disunity at the top has led Mugabe increasingly to take personal command of controversial issues and to take power into his own hands. The leadership increasingly preaches the virtues of a ‘one-party state’ — i.e. of increased dictatorship—as a means suppressing tribalism and class antagonisms.
Already, the parliamentary formalities are increasingly being dropped and the government rules through emergency regulations.
A number of sympathetic studies of the Zimbrabwean state have concluded that the executive and security apparatus enjoys enormous power and has progressively gained more autonomy from parliament, the courts, and the other apparatuses of state.
Repressive powers
The Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) which is part of the ‘Prime Minister’s Office’ and directly controlled by Mugabe has been rapidly expanded. Its top intelligence officers are still the whites who organised the defence of Smith’s regime against the guerilla war.
The security legislation used by Smith to attack the nationalist movement and unions has not been abolished but extended. More than 60 regulations made in terms of the notorious Emergency Powers Act and Law and Order Act of the 1960s have been issued on a wide variety of topics. Regulations in terms of the Indemnity and Compensation Act of 1975 which remove any legal constraints on the armed forces were revived in July 1982.
Cabinet Ministers dealing with security matters have exceptional powers to detain, to ban meetings, and use other legal means to suppress opposition. When persons accused of political crimes have been acquitted by the courts, redetentions are common.
The reports of Commissions of Enquiry into complaints against the security forces have not been made public.
These have been the means by which opposition parties, striking workers, squatters on unused land, and Marxists in ZANU(PF) and the unions etc have been repressed. Rarely has this security apparatus taken action against the old reactionaries—its victims are basically the workers, peasants, and youth who are thought to be political opponents of the regime.
Through using the repressive powers of the state, the ZANU(PF) leaders have cleared the way to a one-party dictatorship. But, without a break with capitalism, this will not solve the national-tribal divisions which are festering in Zimbabwe society—but only after perhaps a temporary period, serve to intensify them.
The national question
It is clear that in Zimbabwe the compromise with capitalism has resulted in painfully slow progress on the land question—the fundamental issue of the Zimbabwean revolution. The postponement of a thorough-going settlement of the land question has fuelled the distrust of the Ndebele peasantry in the Harare government which had also disarmed the ZIPRA guerillas and failed to provide jobs for the youth.
Such mistrust arose that some youth took up arms against the state. Of course, not all ‘dissidents’ came from this background. Many acts of terrorism have clearly been committed by bandits sent in from South Africa, and in some cases apparently even by state agents trying to create an excuse for police action.
Sabotage or government projects, the killing of ZANU officials etc, brought down the terrible wrath of the armed forces under the command of the ZANU(PF) leaders. Killings of peasants, torture, detentions and military rule over Matabeleland followed.
In short, the compromise with capitalism led to an enormous sharpening of national antagonism between Ndebele and Shona.
Matabeleland is now bitterly alienated after the deaths of hundreds or possibly thousands at the hands of the armed forces, particularly the 5th Brigade.
The Ndebele minority now interprets its hardships as the result of being a tribal-national minority—they feel nationally oppressed at the hands of the Shona-dominated Harare government. The lack of progress on the land and social questions (there has been no land resettlement in Matabeleland implemented yet) has made the problem much worse as politicians have sought petty advantage in tribal chauvinism. Both parties exploit their tribal base.
The worsening of the national question since independence reveals similar processes to those described by Trotsky in his History of the Russian Revolution. There, the overthrow of the oppressive Tsar’s imperial regime, and the aspirations for democracy which this brought into the open, led oppressed national minorities to press towards greater autonomy and their own states.
In similar fashion, the relative unification of the black majority achieved in the struggle against the Smith regime has been reversed since the downfall of the regime. With no solution offered to the social problems through a break with capitalism, the aspirations of the Ndebele masses are channelled through their consciousness of oppression as a ‘national group’. In the future, without a break with capitalism, this could even lead to mass Ndebele support for a state of their own.
From the point of view of the development of the productive forces, Marxism favours the largest possible political units, overcoming the barriers which ‘nation-states’ have posed on economic development—but only through voluntary amalgamation and in no way through coercion. Thus the Russian Marxist Lenin explained that, in conditions of national oppression, Marxism must implacably defend the democratic right of nations to self-determination, including their right to secession and establishment of their own state.
This was not a matter of abstract or moral principle, but a vital part of the programme for working-class revolution. By championing the rights of the oppressed, the Marxists aimed to prevent bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalists from dividing the working-class, and peddling utopian capitalist solutions for their real material problems.
In reality, by defending the right of nations to self-determination, Marxism aims to unite the working-class of different nationalities in the struggle for democracy and socialism.
At the same time Lenin argued that there could be no concessions to separatism in the unions and working-class parties—the workers internationally have to build and protect their organised unity.
This basic standpoint of Marxism is not to be found in the leadership of either nationalist party in Zimbabwe. However, since ZANU(PF) is the party in power which has carried through the compromise with capitalism and deployed the armed forces against the Ndebele minority, its leaders have to take the main responsibility for the worsening national question.
It is this leadership which meted out brutal repression against the first stirrings of revolt, and which is now attempting to impose a one-party dictatorship on the Zimbabwean people.
Marxism has always strongly opposed the imposition of unity and the holding together of nations by the use of troops, which has the effect of bitterly dividing the workers and peasants.
The turn now by the ZANU(PF) leadership towards unity talks is not because of tender feelings for the Ndebele workers and peasants by Mugabe, but because the military-police methods have been exhausted. Nevertheless this turn opens up a new political situation which is likely to draw workers, peasants and youth into intense political discussion about the way forward.
Elections
Since independence there have been a number of political crises and some reshuffling of the leadership—but none of these changes have defined a new course to solve the political and economic problems of Zimbabwe.
The July 1985 elections were designed by the Mugabe government to be a conclusive victory for ZANU(PF). But they have brought about changes not anticipated by the leadership. Taken as a whole, these changes amount to a turning-point in the post-independence politics of Zimbabwe.
Both ZANU(PF) and ZAPU approached the elections with big illusions. The ZANU(PF) leadership had high expectations that the Ndebele masses would be persuaded or forced to vote for their candidates. Last minute efforts were made to establish an Ndebele-speaking leadership for the campaign in Matabeleland. They expected that ZAPU could be broken by the crushing weight of military occupation and detentions.
On the other hand, the ZAPU leadership had the illusion that the Shona masses would turn away from ZANU(PF) and give a ‘protest vote’ to ZAPU. They thought that the undoubted dissatisfaction of the Shona masses with the corruption, lack of housing, high prices, and fewer jobs would turn them to ZAPU. This, ZAPU members believed, would build a sufficient groundswell for ZAPU to win.
Results
The election results of an overwhelming majority for ZANU(PF) but also of obstinate support for ZAPU in Matabeleland, were the outcome of several different processes taking place.
Before the elections there were signs that the economic upturn, based on the good rains, had brought particular benefits to the peasantry. An upper layer had benefitted most, but hope of a better life for all also affected the peasant mass.
The petty bourgeois politicians of ZANU(PF) constantly attacked the ‘lazy workers’, and praised the peasantry for their hard work. They know that the peasantry form their most reliable base of support.
In the towns, on the other hand, the social problems were much more obvious, and the situation was more difficult to control.
As was acknowledged in the Financial Times (11 June 1985), the real challenge to the government did not come from the fragmented opposition parties but from “the growing dissatisfaction among the urban population” — the working class in the cities and towns. The government showed its recognition of this fact by attacking the Marxists in the trade unions and ZANU(PF) in the run-up to the elections.
This discontent among the urban working class was shown in widespread criticism of economic policies, in questions raised in party meetings, and in the angry mass opposition to corrupt or unrepresentative ZANU(PF) councillors.
The potential strength of the working-class opposition was shown in the massive marches, especially by the women, against local party leaders in some towns. The party leadership took this discontent seriously. In some cases ministers were sent to negotiate with demonstrators and promised to look into their grievances. At the same time thuggery and violence by the Youth Brigades was encouraged to intimidate urban people even in areas where the opposition parties had little support. It was noticeable in the early stages of the election campaign that the urban masses felt voting would change nothing.
ln the bigger towns, especially Harare, the turnout to register for the elections was very slow. “People seem to treat the vote with levity; and yet thousands of Zimbabweans died for it”, complained the Sunday Times (2 January 1985).
This casual attitude towards the vote showed an awareness among the urban working class that power was not in their hands. Most could see there was no real alternative to ZANU(PF). Many felt its victory would lead to a one-party dictatorship which would have to be accepted.
The indifference among the urban people, particularly in Harare, produced a panicky response from the leadership. Every opposition statement, however feeble, produced a thundering reply from party leaders using their newspapers and radios to the full.
In an important tactical switch, Mugabe pulled back from making the one-party state the key question of the election. He also made concessions to persuade people to vote for the ruling party. The workers were given a wage increase of 15% and the government promised that the new Labour Act would operate in their interests.
In the rural areas, discontent threatened from older and traditional people over legal challenges to the lobola custom. To calm this down, Mugabe called the first gathering of chiefs since independence. He promised that fathers’ traditional rights over their daughters would continue, and made concessions to the powers of the chiefs.
ZANU(PF) presented itself as the party of order and development and attacked ZAPU as the party of the dissidents.
To make his election victory more credible internationally, Mugabe allowed opposition parties some access to the press. ZANU’s face towards the Ndebele minority, however, remained truculent and dictatorial. In his personal appearances in Matabeleland, Mugabe promised a tougher policy towards the Ndebele, hoping to force acceptance of ZANU(PF)’s power to rule ‘forever’.
ZAPU approached the elections in a weak state of organisation. Virtually every party organiser had been detained. The reign of terror by the state after the Midlands riots of June 1984 broke ZAPU’s organised support in Beitbridge, Chinoyi, and most of the Midlands.
ZAPU’s electoral strategy was for a ‘united front’ of all ‘progressives’ to unite Zimbabwe, and the one-party state was opposed. But the leaders put forward no programme for unity so it would not exclude any group! At the same time as calling for a ‘united front’ of all ‘progressives’ it launched bitter attacks on the ‘fascism’ of ZANU, thus deliberately excluding ZANU from among the ‘progressives’.
The ‘united front’ could thus be nothing more than a reactionary anti-Mugabe bloc of all pro-capitalist opposition parties and Smith. Such a mixed bag of sell-outs, racists, and opportunists had no chance of success. Not even the assassination of five leading members of UANC could bring ZAPU and UANC together in an electoral pact. All-in-all there were 258 candidates, mainly from the fragmented opposition parties, fighting for only 80 seats!
In the hysterical atmosphere of party violence, which was only a thin cover for tribalism, ZAPU ‘s supporters outside Matabeleland retreated. In the elections to the district council in the Beitbridge area, formerly a ZAPU stronghold it did not win a single seat.
But in the run-up to the parliamentary elections, District Council results in Matabeleland showed a different picture. Here, with Ndebele in an overwhelming majority, there was a fierce loyalty to ZAPU.
ZAPU candidates were almost universally elected even when voters were threatened with violence if they voted for ‘The Dissident’—that is the ZAPU candidate. The government was so embarrassed that the District Council election results were not published for months.
The white elections
The white elections were a victory for the die-hard elements among the whites; Smith’s party candidates won 5 out of the 20 seats reserved for whites. The success of anti-Mugabe candidates in these elections revealed a trend which only Marxism—though it did not anticipate it entirely—could explain.
The compromise with the whites, enshrined in Lancaster House and in the policy of the ZANU(PF) leadership, is not a policy equally supported on both sides. There has been precious little ‘change of heart’ among the whites, only a recognition of the current relationship of power. Their acceptance of the policy of ‘reconciliation’ has not changed their attitude towards ordinary Zimbabwean workers and peasants, which remains one of contempt and racial arrogance.
The ZANU(PF) leadership was taken in by flattery, fawning, and offers of gifts to speed their corruption, as evidence of genuine co-operation at a political level. But the present situation is a graphic illustration of the results of class-collaboration. The white bourgeois and landowners have taken advantage of the ‘historic compromise’ of Lancaster House to secure their own position and preach the most reactionary monetarist doctrines. The results of these policies—higher prices, wage freezes, redundancies and factory closures—are then blamed on the ‘socialism’ of Mugabe!
But the election results have knocked a few potholes into the smooth road of collaboration.
Two political trends among the whites offered themselves to the white electorate: Smith’s Conservative Alliance (CAZ) and the ‘independents’.
Smith and his aging cronies launched a campaign blatantly defending capitalism and his past record in putting the interests of the whites first. Undoubtedly part of Smith’s strategy was to form an anti-Mugabe bloc in the West, as he stood as a candidate for the first time in Bulawayo.
The ‘independents’, generally the direct representatives of the big capitalist interests follow a policy of accepting the compromise in order more effectively to combat the socialist aspirations of the Zimbabwean masses. They were enthusiastically endorsed by the ZANU leadership as ‘genuine non-racialists’.
Undoubtedly a factor in the anti-Mugabe vote among the whites was the fear of a one-party dictatorship, of Zimbabwe taking the path of so many African countries of tribal violence and civil war. The whites did not support the idea of genuine democratic rights, but they feared the growth of arbitrary state power would lead to a loss of their privileges.
There are thus some differences in approach to the one-party state question. Big capital is cautiously in favour of a one-party dictatorship—if such a government could secure the peace by agreement or by the gun in Matabeleland. lt is fairly confident of finding new ways of incorporating white privilege and capitalist interests into the framework of a one-party dictatorship under Mugabe.
The ZANU leadership has encouraged this approach by promising to include a number of white candidates on the ZANU ticket in a future one-party ‘election’.
Faced with the challenge of the whites to his authority, Mugabe fumed but retreated. He said that the 20 white seats entrenched in the constitution “must go immediately.” But he did not then seek the support of ZAPU’s MPs to abolish the 20 white seats entrenched in the constitution.
With the agreement of ZAPU the 70% ‘yes’ vote in the House of Assembly necessary to abolish the white seats after April 1987 would be reached. This would open the way to forcing through a one-party state with a unanimous vote before April 1990. After this date only a 70% vote in the Assembly is needed to establish a one-party state.
Instead of seeking ZAPU’s support, he escalated his political attack on ZAPU in a fresh attempt to solve the ‘ZAPU problem’.
A turning-point
Not only the white, but the other election results surprised both ZANU(PF) and ZAPU leaders, and set in motion a series of political events which have now resulted in the opening of negotiations between the leadership of both parties.
The underlying political process revealed by the elections has meant that the talks which are now taking place are qualitatively different from the many sessions of talks previously held between ZANU(PF) and ZAPU. The reasons for this change lie in the shattering of the illusions promoted by the respective leaders in the support they would each receive nation-wide.
Ironically, the election results confirmed the over-whelming support for ZANU(PF) among the Shona majority—but fell well short of being a conclusive victory. On the face of it, ZANU(PF) made major gains by increasing its vote from 1,7m to 2,2m between 1980 and 1985, out of an electorate or 2,9m. This support was based on the hope that Mugabe would implement measures in favour of the masses (socialism), if only the political obstacles in his way could be removed.
But the crushing majority won by ZANU(PF) nation-wide could not hide the fact that it could not make in-roads into ZAPU’s Matabeleland base. Despite a reign of terror in Matabeleland marked by forced attendance at ZANU(PF) meetings, forced buying of ZANU(PF) party cards, torture, massacres and blackmail (all of which served to warn the Ndebele of the dire consequences of continuing to support ZAPU), the vote for ZANU(PF) was only 12,9 per cent of the Matabeleland electorate.
Significantly, the firmest support for ZANU(PF) came from the Bulawayo area, from Shona businessmen and civil servants attracted there.
The problems within ZANU(PF) were hidden under a barrage of attacks on ZAPU.
But the election results were also a body-blow for the ZAPU leadership. Despite considerable urban discontent, a protest vote in favour of the opposition parties did not develop outside Matabeleland as the workers could not see any advantage to them in anti-Mugabe party groupings.
For ZANU(PF) the results confirmed its predominance as the party representing the majority Shona, Muzorewa’s UANC is to all intents and purposes dead. ZANU(Sithole) secured one seat; but, despite some support in the south-east, is also breaking up.
For ZAPU the results confirmed the fact the leadership had tried to avoid: that ZAPU is now a parry of the Ndebele without the prospect of gaining even a protest vote in other areas of Zimbabwe. ZAPU’s support in the eastern two-thirds of the country dominated by ZANU(PF) virtually collapsed, and in the Midlands the party vote was halved from 27 per cent in 1980 to 14 per cent in this election.
The shocks and tremors within the ZAPU leadership were shown when they did not seriously challenge the fairness of the elections. The leadership and activists were faced with the realisation that ZAPU is a tribal-national party of a minority. On this basis there were only two alternatives—either a deal with ZANU(PF) or a hardening regional line leading towards separatism.
Some ZANU(PF) leaders reported that some Ndebele were already talking of the ‘Republic of Mthwakazi’ and that Matabeleland already felt like a state within a state. But Nkomo calculated that it would be more to his advantage to seek a deal with Mugabe than to encourage separation. The majority of the Ndebele were still against such a direction.
Although fairly soon after the elections Nkomo made overtures to Mugabe, the reaction of the ZANU(PF) leadership was one of intensified repression. By making almost daily threats to ban ZAPU, Mugabe was prepared to take the inter-party struggle to the brink. Any further steps would have driven ZAPU underground and sparked off fresh explosions in Matabeleland.
These extreme policies were the inevitable result of the dilly-dallying on the land question and the lack of progress on all social quesions. On the basis of compromise with capitalism no decisive progress was possible.
The appointment of Enos Nkala as Minister of Home Affairs after the election showed how determined Mugabe was to secure the complete surrender of Nkomo, rather than settle for an uneasy deal. Nkala, himself Ndebele-speaking, is a long-standing enemy of Nkomo. He had stood as a ZANU(PF) candidate in Matabeleland and lost his deposit. Yet after the elections Mugabe insulted the Ndebele people by appointing him to settle issues with ZAPU.
A new security apparatus was set up and detentions of ZAPU leaders followed. Nkomo’s body-guards were disarmed during a campaign to have him ‘eliminated’.
With hindsight it now appears that the role of Nkala was to deliver Nkomo to the negotiating table bound and gagged. With any remaining national ambitions of Nkomo destroyed, his lieutenants and followers could be brought into the ruling party. ZANU(PF) would then have the mantle of a truly national party.
It is impossible to follow the dynamics of the moves towards a deal without an understanding of the situation in Southern Africa as a whole.
The pressures on Mugabe
A powerful factor in Mugabe’s thinking must have been the devastation of Mozambique and Angola by reactionary bands directly supported by South Africa.
Up to 20,000 Zimbabwean troops are now deployed in Mozambique to secure lines of transport and combat the MNR. The tops of the security apparatus have no illusions that a quick and easy victory is likely because of the devastation of the country and the collapse of FRELIMO’s authority in many areas. A costly, drawn-out military operation, which is most likely, will drain increasing resources from the Zimbabwean state.
Faced with this prospect, Mugabe had every reason to consider the military cost of repression in Matabeleland.
As a pragmatic politician he was forced to recognise that the military occupation of Matabeleland had not produced the political results he had expected. Continuation of this policy would inevitably invite deeper South African involvement in support of reactionary bands, which would seek the support of an oppressed tribal-national group.
Fighting on these two fronts, it was likely that the army and police would become bogged down and weary. The political implications were dangerous to the ruling elite.
There was an element of risk in the strategy of smashing ZAPU and forcing Nkomo to the wall. There was always the possibility that Nkomo, incapable of providing a socialist solution, could have been driven in the direction of separatism and alliance with South Africa.
But, despite being defenceless, Nkomo had an important card to play—the continued and solid support of the Ndebele for ZAPU. This meant that the unequal partnership of convenience would not have to be a humiliating surrender for Nkomo. Even so, it will involve him in a less powerful position than he had before.
It is reported that the deal will be based on the representation of ZAPU within the leading organs of ZANU(PF) in proportion to its electoral support.
But, these practical arrangements will cause new headaches and tensions within the ZANU(PF) leadership. These can be overcome (and then only temporarily) by Mugabe taking increasing power into his own hands, and balancing between the different political-regional factions within ZANU(PF).
The working class and peasantry may wonder at the amazing zig-zags of the politicians. But many will sigh with relief that Mugabe had the boldness to attempt to resolve the tribal-national division of the country.
For all these internal and external reasons it is likely that the deal will he made, despite the formidable hurdles which will have to be jumped.
The incorporation of what remains of the ZAPU leadership into ZANU(PF), under the slogan of unity, will undoubtedly bring a welcome pause to the tribal-national battles. The frenzy whipped up by the ZANU(PF) leadership before and after the elections will now recede. But the poison of tribal prejudice has seeped into the consciousness of some sections of the working class, and certainly remains in the peasantry.
Building ‘unity’ at the top by rearranging party positions and securing the voluntary winding up of ZAPU will bring a temporary pause to the vicious anti-ZAPU campaign which carried all the marks of a crude tribal struggle.
This will remove one of the formidable obstacles to rebuilding the unity of workers in Bulawayo, Harare and the crucial area of the Midlands.
Problems of one-party rule
At the same time it will open up new problems in the ruling pally. The incorporation of selected ZAPU leaders into privileged positions, at the expense of ZANU(PF) careerists, has been fought with the greatest energy by sections of the latter.
Even though Mugabe may succeed in over-riding this opposition and ‘uniting’ with Nkomo, this will import all the divisions of the middle-class leadership into a single party.
After a period of celebration and ‘reconciliation’, the petty squabbling among the leaders will resume. Basically the ‘new’ ruling party will consist of ZAPU supporters in Matabeleland, and ZANU(PF) supporters in the East. In the Midlands, where the parties are more evenly divided, there are likely to be fierce battles to determine which local party leadership predominates.
When the unity deal is seen to have solved none of the social problems, there will be a growing realisation that the politicians have looked after themselves very nicely. The workers and peasants will want to put forward genuine leaders of the working people to replace corrupt party hacks.
Workers of ZANU(PF) and ZAPU will be able to see more clearly the need for class policies against their common exploitation, and seek unity with their fellow workers against pro-capitalist leaders. Ndebele workers particularly will find that the ZAPU leaders have done nothing to secure their interests, and will look for a way forward.
But spontaneous tendencies towards working-class unity can be cut across by the deep-rooted tribal and national divisions by unscrupulous politicians. The national question will not go away just because a single party has been proclaimed, as the Karanga-Zezuru conflicts within ZANU(PF) have demonstrated.
After a temporary pause, it is inevitable that tribal-national discrimination and oppression will resurface. Since capitalism cannot deliver the goods, the competition for land, jobs, and education will follow the old tribal and regional channels.
Only a genuine socialist leadership in the working class can cut across this process, by building and sustaining firm unity among Shona and Ndebele workers on the basis of linking the struggle for decent wages, jobs, homes, education, and land to the struggle for socialism against the pro-capitalist leadership of both ZAPU and ZANU(PF).