Theses on Europe
1) The relative cooling of the EU crisis following the Greek catastrophe and betrayal of Tsipras has been shattered by Brexit and the vote for Britain to leave the EU. At the same time the refugee crisis, the continuing turmoil following the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the British Labour Party and growing electoral support for right-wing populist forces in some countries are indications of the unresolved crises and continuing tensions facing the European ruling classes.
2) Europe, since the World Congress in January 2016 has not, in general, seen a mass upturn in strikes and protests by the working class. This is mainly due to the cowardly role which the trade union bureaucracy continues to play, and also a turn towards the electoral plane in some countries. Even in Belgium, which did see a large national protest and partial general strike in September – the trade union bureaucracy has derailed this movement once again.
3) However, France did experience mass protests, which lasted three months, against reforms in the labour law. This reflected the underlying bitterness and anger which still exists in most European countries. Also significantly in Ireland, despite the extensive bourgeois propaganda campaign about the economic recovery underway, a number of particularly militant strikes involving bus workers and tram workers have broken out.
4) Although there has not been a broad upsurge of militant generalised struggles in the recent period, there have been some small significant strikes and struggles which have been victorious in many countries. The victorious struggle of the dockers in Lisbon against casualization has been largely unreported in the capitalist media for conscious reasons, but illustrates that combative struggle, despite the obstacles, can win results. The role the CWI’s Greek section played in leading a victorious struggle of cleaners in Athens was also significant. The local victory against evictions of the “Butterfields” tenants in London, largely due to the role of the Socialist Party, also illustrates what can be achieved.
5) The previous massive movement of general strikes in Greece, as we have explained, resulted in a defeat for the working class due to the betrayal of the SYRIZA leadership. The general strikes in Spain and mass movement there and in Portugal, France and other countries ran up against the limitations of the leadership, while the working class was not at this stage capable of fully imposing an alternative strategy from below, despite noble attempts.
6) On a national scale, the victory of the movement in Ireland against the water charges, led by CWI members and others, demonstrates how with correct methods and tactics it is possible to defeat such attacks on the working class. Struggles on social issues, such for the right to abortion in Ireland – both North and South – in which the socialist Party is playing a leading role, as well as in Poland and elsewhere, are also extremely significant.
7) An important feature of the situation in recent months has been significant struggles involving new layers of the working class which has begun to be drawn into action and organisation for the first time. In Britain, delivery workers at Deliveroo and Uber, and in Italy at Foodora – have moved into action for the first time. These movements of new layers of precarious workers, although in an initial stage, are a pointer to future struggles by these new sections of the working class.
8) The extremely combative and radicalised struggle by the junior hospital doctors in Britain, a formerly middle class layer, is indicative of how the crisis has hit petit bourgeois layers, which are being driven to embrace the traditions and methods of struggle of the working class. One of the consequences of the crisis is the eating away of the traditional social reserves of capitalism in the middle class layers of society.
9) These developments are an answer to the capitalist commentators and others on the left who have simply bemoaned the decline of the traditional sections of the working class. The hollowing out of industry in many European countries has undoubtedly weakened the traditional sections of the working class. The growth in precarious jobs; the fact that in many countries young workers have two or three jobs poses new obstacles for these workers and for socialists in terms of how to organise and struggle. In this respect, some of the features of the neo-colonial world are now present in Europe. The first entry of this new layer of workers into struggle is therefore extremely significant.
10) The underlying economic and social crisis has not been resolved in the EU economies despite an extremely sluggish growth which has been recorded in some countries, such as Ireland, Spain and to a certain extent Germany. Even in these countries, the “recovery” has been marked by growing trend in precarious, low wage jobs. The crisis at Deutsche Bank illustrates that the threat of new crisis in the finance sector remains ever present. Other flash-points like Italy, Portugal or a re-eruption of the Greek crisis could trigger a renewed and deeper crisis. The prospect for such a scenario is reflected by the continuing drama and upheaval of Brexit. The Socialist Party in England and Wales has clearly analysed and commented on these dramatic events.
11) As the Socialist Party and the CWI explained, the vote to leave the EU in Britain sent shock waves throughout the EU and stunned the ruling class in Britain. We produced an array of material analysing this critical development. Yet, nearly six months after the result, the powerful political and economic aftershocks of this earthquake are still being felt across the continent. Many capitalist commentators dismissed “leave” voters as, reactionary, ignorant, uneducated, inward looking racists.
12) Such sentiments were even echoed by some on the “left” who saw in the result the prospect of a strengthening of right-wing populist forces or leaders like Nigel Farage or Boris Johnson. It was only the Socialist Party and some militant trade unionists, such as in the RMT, which correctly saw in this vote to leave the EU a revolt, albeit it without a clear working class leadership, amongst the most down-trodden and oppressed against the ruling elite.
13) Despite, like all referendums, having many facets, both positive and negative, it was overwhelmingly a revolt of the poor against the rich, reflecting the degree of alienation which exists following decades of attacks on living standards and the application of austerity policies. On the other hand, many who voted to remain, especially amongst the youth, did so with the best of intentions – opposing racism and out of a sense of well-intentioned “internationalism”, linked to the right to travel and study or work abroad, for example.
14) The immediate political effects of this political earthquake resulted in the resignation of ex-Prime Minister Cameron, ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne and UKIP leader, Nigel Farage. Then, reflecting the open split which existed in the Tories, Boris Johnson, was the victim of a political assassination when his former collaborator, Michael Gove, knifed him in the back and challenged for leadership of the Tory party. Both were defeated, and Theresa May was crowned leader in an uncontested election as other candidates, withdrew under pressure from the capitalist class which was desperate to try and establish some political stability. She became the new Prime Minister – voted for by nobody.
15) Had Jeremy Corbyn supported a leave vote he could have changed the entire character of the campaign and would have emerged in a commanding position, with mass support. He originally opposed membership of the EEC in 1974 and continued to be strongly critical of the EU until he was elected Labour leader. This was a massive lost opportunity by Corbyn and his advisers.
16) The rage and bitterness against the political leaders and sense of betrayal and alienation which was expressed in the Brexit vote has not been lost on the ruling class, and specifically on the new leadership of the Tory Party. Rhetorically, May and other party leaders have attempted to reflect this, hoping to appeal to disillusioned Labour voters. Gone are demands for more austerity and a diminished role of the state. The Conservative party is now “the party for the working class”, May claimed. This is something repeated by other capitalist parties, especially those on the far right. May even invoked the former Labour Prime Minister – Clement Attlee! Now the state must lead, to assist the market where necessary, they say. Past policies of Cameron and Osborne have been repudiated – in words, of course.
17) Verbally, it represents the abandonment of austerity. Yet in practice, the cuts and more austerity continue to be applied by the government. At the same time, it represents a recognition by sections of the ruling class that the constant application of austerity is not a solution for the decline and crisis facing British capitalism. May has also combined rhetorically championing the “interests of workers”, with whipping up racism and anti-immigrant sentiment.
18) At this stage the May faction seems to have lent more towards supporting a “hard Brexit” with all of the risk that this entails. At least, that will be their starting point in the negotiations. This has only deepened the divisions within the Tory party, which could split over this issue.
19) The consequences of Brexit have also shaken the EU to its core. It has raised the spectre that other countries such as the Netherlands could decide to follow Britain out the door and begin a process of the Eurozone, and the entire EU unravelling in its current form. Fear of this is one of the reasons that leaders of the EU, along with Merkel and Hollande, have verbally adopted, thus far, a “hard line” in dealing with Britain. They are attempting to frighten others considering taking a similar path that it will result in a disaster.
20) Following the Greek crisis, it appeared on the surface that a relative stability had been achieved in the EU. However, Brexit has revealed that this was not the case. Following this crisis, others are likely to erupt in the coming period. Italy and the possibility of (Delete underlined)Renzi’s defeat in the forthcoming referendum triggered his resignation and the implosion of his government (Delete) threatening new turmoil and social upheavals. The perilous state of the Italian banking system and growing (insert) hostility to the euro and EU in Italy mean that is can easily become a candidate for “Itexit” or at least exit from the eurozone.
21) This, coupled with Brexit, would signal the end of the EU in its current configuration. The failure of the bailout in Greece to resolve the economic catastrophe and the prospect of a further bailout, with yet more bitter austerity, mean it is still possible that Greece could be ejected from the euro. This prospect has once again surfaced for debate within the German bourgeois media.
22) The increased national tensions between European countries have continued and been aggravated by the refugee crisis. At the same time, tensions and divisions continue to develop between different wings of the capitalist classes within EU countries.
23) Europe, like the rest of the world, is gripped by a collapse in the social roots of all the traditional parties – both the traditional capitalist parties and the former bourgeois workers’ parties which have embraced capitalism. The only real difference between various countries is the degree to which this has taken place. There is an ingrained mistrust and scepticism towards the political leaders and political system. This process has increasingly affected not only big sections of the working class, but the middle class as well.
24) In Austria, the ruling traditional right-wing Peoples Party (ÖVP) is languishing at around 19% in the opinion polls. In France, Hollande’s approval ratings collapsed to the point where he has withdrawn from seeking re-election for a second term. Merkel and the CDU as well as the SPD have been seriously weakened – reflecting the growing alienation from the established parties and the polarisation which developed in society through their policies as far as the so called refugee crisis is concerned.
25) At the same time, while the ruling and traditional parties have been dramatically weakened and undermined, the new left forces which have emerged have not yet offered a clear socialist alternative. The timid “reformist” ideas which their leaders advocate today are but a pale reflection of the socialist, left reformist, ideas defended by the left in the 1970s and 1980s. Then, the nationalisation of major companies and the general idea of socialism as an alternative society were defended by the left, albeit on a reformist basis.
26) The depth of the crisis in Europe has left the new left parties floundering when put to the test, as the ideas and programme they have adopted has proved wholly inadequate in the face of the depth of the crisis. This was most graphically demonstrated by Tsipras’s betrayal in Greece and subsequent defeat of the movement in Greece, at this stage. This is an important warning for the working class of the weakness of the extremely timid reformist ideas supported by the leadership of the new left formations at this stage.
27) The defeat in Greece did however have a certain significant impact on sections of the Left, especially in Spain and Portugal. It was one of the factors why the Left Bloc in Portugal and the IU in Spain have adopted, at least in words, a much more hostile rhetoric towards the EU institutions. Both even – on paper at least – pose the issue of preparing to be ejected from the euro and the EU.
28) More recently, in the re-run of the Spanish general election – the second in six months- the leadership of PODEMOS having swung to the right towards “moderation”, failed to make the breakthrough it could have. The alliance ‘Unidos/PODEMOS” – involving Podemos, IU and other parties – lost one million votes in June, compared with December 2015!
29) As the CWI has explained over the last few years, the emergence and explosive growth of new Left parties such as Podemos and Syriza, represented a huge step forward, reflecting a strong shift to the Left in the consciousness of broad sections of the working class and youth. Moreover, the consciousness of workers and youth, at least in their most advanced sections, has in general tended to be to the Left of the positions and approach put forward by the leaders of these formations, also in the case of Corbyn in Britain. This represents a mass search for a political alternative to austerity, which includes mass support for important elements of a socialist programme. However, the new left parties that have emerged in Europe, have not yet developed as genuine workers’ parties. In general, while important sections of the working class and youth have supported them electorally, the working class have not joined them and shaped them as real instruments for the struggles of the working class.
30) They have, as result, assumed more the character of left or radical ‘populist’ movements at this stage. This also reflects the petty bourgeois social composition of most of the leadership of these forces. We do not employ the term ‘populist’ in the sense of the capitalist commentators, who often use this term to insult any left or radical demand, but as a political characterisation. The emergence of “populist” movements, both of the left and the right, is one of the main features of the situation in Europe at this stage. However, it is important that we distinguish between left wing populism and right-wing populism. Both are extremely unstable and vague, which is the character of political populism. However, the emergence of left “populism” reflects one aspect of the throwing back of political consciousness since the collapse of Stalinism. The new generation of the working class which has moved into struggle against the effects of the crisis in 2007/8 has not yet, in general, drawn a broad socialist conclusion along with the need to build its’ own independent political party. This reflects the absence of a mass combative socialist alternative which propagates this idea. “Populism” develops as a force where independent socialist parties of the working class are either very weak or do not exist.
31) The new left parties which have emerged are extremely varied and very different. They are however unstable, fluctuate in terms of support, and it remains uncertain how they will develop or how long they will last. It is correct for us to intervene and orientate towards them where appropriate and to develop bold but flexible tactics. However, these parties have not yet developed into strong workers’ parties at this stage.
32) The development of mass workers’ parties and a more distinctly socialist consciousness is now more likely to develop with the onset of a new phase of crisis for European and global capitalism. The Left “populists”, while articulating much of the anger of workers, are by their very character, vague, confused and unclear. Historically, they have tended to diminish the idea of class struggle, with vague appeals for “social justice”, lacking a clearly defined class content.
33) Today in Spain, PODEMOS leaders champion the “pueblo” against the “casta”. The “people” against the “caste”. None of them clearly champion a struggle of the working class against capitalism. Also, as we have explained, under the guise of “democracy”, these political forces are usually far from democratic, with a top-down character and no real democratic check or control from an active party rank and file.
34) In Greece, following the capitulation of Tsripras, the launch of the Popular Unity failed to develop due to its top down, rigid approach, and lack of a rounded out socialist programme. In the recent period it has declined further and is unlikely to recover if it continues with this method and approach. In Italy, the populist “Five Star Movement” – which is different to SYRIZA or PODEMOS is very contradictory and varies greatly in character from area to area – may still gain electorally in new elections. It contains an element of left populism and right-wing populism.
35) A timid approach, weak programme and top-down methods have repelled many workers from getting actively involved in new Left formations and it remains unclear how they will develop. The new generation has not yet fully drawn the conclusion that they must forge a party as a weapon of struggle against capitalism. The emergence of PODEMOS from the ‘indignados’ movement represented a step forward. Within the ‘indignados’ movement there was initially an element of an “anti-party” consciousness. Despite this significant advance, the masses have not yet been able to seize hold of Podemos and fashion it as an instrument of struggle.
36) Podemos leadership, which had swung to the right, has now entered into a power struggle with a right-wing challenge to Iglesias. He, in response has swung to the “left” and has reverted back to calls for mass protest – including a general strike, should the PP cobble together a government with the support of the majority of PSOE MPs. It is not excluded that PODEMOS could split or swing further to the left.
37) Spain has been gripped by a political deadlock since the general elections of December 2015. The ruling class are demanding that PSOE votes to allow the PP to form a new government. This could result in the PASOKisation of PSOE at the subsequent election! The ruling class is thus risking the electoral extinction of PSOE for the sake of short term parliamentary political “stability”.
38) Fear of this, and reflecting the massive opposition amongst the PSOE membership and social base to the party voting to allow the PP to form a government, has led to an open division in the party and the removal of Sanchez from the leadership in what amounts to a coup by the most extreme pro-bourgeois wing of the party represented by Felipe Gonzalez and backed by the regional barons of the party. Sanchez is no radical left, but is reflecting the pressure the party feels and is fearful of the electoral consequences of backing the PP. This is an extremely significant development. Yet the existence of PODEMOS and the IU makes it less likely that a “Corbyn” style development will take place around Sanchez or others, although this could not be entirely excluded.
39) The national question, especially in Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia is a crucial issue in Spain as in other countries. The refusal of PODEMOS to repudiate the idea of the right of self- determination and a referendum in Catalonia was one of the main obstacles which prevented an agreement being reached between its leadership and PSOE. The Spanish ruling will determinedly oppose any attempt to call a referendum.
40) The national question is of crucial importance for the workers’ movement in Spain and throughout Europe. As in Scotland, support for the demand for independence can wax and wane at different stages. The CWI defends the democratic rights of all peoples. In Catalonia we support the right of the peoples of Catalonia to decide their own fate through a referendum, and emphasise the key role of the working class in the struggle for this right. At the same time we have to clearly oppose the pro-capitalist nationalist parties like the CiU in Catalonia or the PNV in the Basque country. We need also to defend the rights of all minorities within a socialist Catalonia, and argue against any illusions which may exist in an independent capitalist Catalonia as a panacea. This needs to be linked to the idea of a united struggle of all of the people of the Spanish State and Iberian Peninsula as a whole for a voluntary democratic socialist confederation of free peoples.
41) There has been a certain paralysis in the mass movement in the Spanish state in the recent period. The prospect of a new PP government may herald the resurgence of a new wave of mass struggle in Spain. The extremely successful student general strike called by the SE on 26th October is very important in this context. This, together with the bold and correct tactics, will give revolutionary socialists in Spain the opportunities to make significant advances.
42) The populist vagaries, compromising and undemocratic features present in PODEMOS an in SYRIZA in Greece are also reflected in the movement around Corbyn in Britain , despite the fact that this movement has, for the reasons explained in other material, taken place through the Labour Party.
43) The desperate attempts by the leaders of Momentum and those around Corbyn to reach a “compromise” with the right-wing of the party still, one year after his initial election, make the outcome very unclear. They have left the right-wing Labour apparatus un-challenged. The methods and approach they are adopting amount to a British version of the approach of the Podemos’ leaders. The attempts to reach a compromise with the right-wing and refusal to challenge them could result in the implosion of the movement around Corbyn – just as Podemos’ structures were emptied as the leadership moved further to the right.
44) The developments in Portugal and recent growth of the Left Bloc illustrate how these new, volatile and unstable new left forces can fluctuate. Initially being on the “right” of the new forces and adopting the most pro-Euro/EU stance, the impact of the betrayal in Greece and impact of the crisis drove the Left Bloc leadership in a more radical direction. Following this, it made substantial gains at the recent election. While the Left Bloc and Communist Party were correct to facilitate the formation of the Socialist Party government they made a crucial mistake of signing up to a four year political stability pact. This can imprison both parties into supporting the SP government when it moves to implement further anti-working measures. Nevertheless, this movement around the Left Bloc is extremely significant and has already given big opportunities for the CWI to intervene.
45) The lack of combative powerful workers’ parties has not only allowed a phase of left “populism” to develop in many European countries. It has also allowed the right-wing populist racist forces to strengthen their position in many countries. This has partly been in consequence to the refugee crisis and the inability of the left to offer an alternative which defends the rights of all migrants and oppose racism and also answers the fears of workers and others who feel threatened that their conditions will be further attacked and undermined. Alongside the right of migrants to stay, it is necessary to demand an increase in resources and investment in jobs for all, an agreed minimum wage and public services which are available to all.
46) The failure of the left to develop or offer an alternative in some countries poses the threat of the coming into government some racist, populist forces. This is still a possibility in Austria where the FPÖ, despite not winning the Presidency, is leading in the opinion polls and maybe in a position, after the next parliamentary elections, to head the government. The growth of the AfD in Germany in recent state elections also reflects the dangers posed.
47) In France, the collapse in support for Socialist Party may mean that the French workers’ may be faced with the invidious choice of Le Pen from the Front National, versus Fillon from ‘The Republicans – LR’. This will pose a complicated electoral and tactical question for the CWI. In 2002, when Jean-Marie Le Pen was against the bourgeois candidate Chirac we advocated street mobilisations, while understanding many would vote for Chirac, we advocated a blank vote and at the same time called on people to prepare for the next stage of the struggle and assemble the biggest force possible to prepare for launching a mass workers’ party (the far left, LO and LCR won nearly 10% of the vote). If there was the serious prospect of a Le Pen victory at this time we explained it would have been correct to vote against Le Pen and lend a vote to Chirac in the second round, while preparing to struggle against a government led by him. However, this was not the case then. A Le Pen victory today also seems less likely but it could not be excluded. If the choice today is between Le Pen and Fillon, it would probably not be possible to call for a vote for him in the second round given the extreme right-wing programme he is advocating and the social disaster this would mean and also taking into account the hatred which exists towards him by big layers. Given a choice between Le Pen and Fillon we would need to agitate for a third round on the streets in mass protests and struggle and also call for a new political force of the workers and youth. The growing support for Melechon at this stage, despite his limitations will also be an important developments which can affect the situation creating a stronger basis to develop the left.
48) The coming to power of right-wing populist parties, in some countries, clearly would be a set-back for the working class and the left. It would reflect the absence of powerful mass workers’ parties which allowed the right to step into the vacuum. Such a development would heighten racial tension and be accompanied by the introduction of more authoritarian measures against the working class and immigrants in a parliamentary bonapartist fashion. However, such a development would not be comparable to the coming to power of fascist regimes in the 1930s. The balance of class forces at this stage does not allow for this development today. It is significant that these parties have mainly shed, distanced themselves, from the open fascist wings which were present in the past. They have presented themselves in a very populist manner, often appealing to working class or most down-trodden sections of it.
49) The traditional capitalist parties such as the conservative Party in Britain, as the new government of Theresa May demonstrates, can also be capable of embracing some of the ideas and programme of the right-wing populist movements in order to try and win electoral popularity. This has been seen in Scandinavia where the main establishment parties have all swung to the right.
50) Any right-wing populist victory, for example in France, would certainly prepare the ground for an even bigger back lash and social explosions leading to a swing to the left following such an experience. It would be marked by a big polarisation allowing the working class and revolutionary left to intervene and make important gains. In a mild form, this has already been seen in Austria and Germany. This is an anticipation of what would develop on a much higher level should such right-wing populist parties come to power.
51) Such a development is not a certainty. However, the CWI and working class need to be prepared for such a development due to the delay in building mass workers’ parties.
52) The issues of migration and the refugee crisis are crucial issues for the workers’ movement and the CWI. Initiating and intervening in anti-racist struggles and developing a nuanced approach and demands and slogans that correspond to the each situation and consciousness is a crucial task for the CWI and its’ sections in this period.
53) The extreme right-wing Populist governments which exist in some Central and Eastern European countries like Hungary and Poland are not as strong as they appear. They party reflect the effects on political consciousness of the former Stalinist regimes. They have enacted vicious repressive legislation and have attempted to whip up racist and nationalist sentiments using the refugee crisis to play on the fears of the population. This has brought them into conflict with the EU. However, these populist regimes do not have the solid social basis that they appear to have.
54) In Hungary the recent referendum called by Orbán on the refugee question was an attempt to rally support. Even the neo-fascist Jobbik opposition could not really distinguish itself from the government in this campaign. Yet the government is not popular and is viewed as corrupt. It failed to secure the necessary 50% turnout for the proposal to become law. This was despite a vicious campaign by the Fidész government.
55) In Poland, the attempts by Law and Justice government to introduce anti-abortion legislation were met with ferocious resistance and protest which included a “strike” called by women which the trade union federation, OPZZ, was compelled to defend. The fact that the government was compelled to retreat on this issue is extremely significant. This was done despite the opposition of the Roman Catholic Church to the strike and protest movement which it condemned as “a carnival of the devil”. This victory can embolden other sections of workers to also move into struggle. This together with the significant development of the small party, RAZEM, heralds the beginning of a new situation in Poland.
56) The recent developments in Europe and the EU have confirmed the broad outline of the analysis of the CWI as developed at the last world congress. The prospect of the intensification of the euro and EU crisis in the next period is certain. New battles and struggles are set to erupt in a series of countries. The onset of a new economic crisis is likely to have a profound effect on the political consciousness of the most combative and active layers of the workers and youth, placing the issue of socialism as an alternative system back onto the political agenda.
57) The development of new struggles of the working class and the need to build new mass workers’ parties will pose big opportunities for the CWI sections to make significant advances through combative interventions in these struggles and the application of bold, audacious and flexible tactics.