Since the Lancaster House agreement in late 1979, the people or Zimbabwe have experienced many important changes. Most important has been the achievement of black majority rule and the end of the war which cost the lives of 30,000 people.
In the period following, many peasants were able to build permanent houses for the first time in many years without fear that they would be pulled down again. Families were reunited. Ex-combatants struggled to catch up with lost opportunities, particularly in education.
Under Mugabe’s ZANU(PF) government, many social reforms were introduced, in the fields of education, health, etc.
Most of all, independence brought a feeling that the African people would at last have their people in government.
Yet the first elections since independence, held in July 1985, while producing an even bigger majority for ZANU(PF), at the same time revealed numerous signs of the growing disappointment among the masses that what they had expected from majority rule had not yet been achieved. The sore of tribal-national division between Shona and Ndebele was the most stark reflection that the Zimbabwean revolution had become stalled. What is the way forward?
The draft of this document was written at the time of those elections, to address that central question. Revisions were subsequently made to the draft, circulated in early 1986, to clarify its arguments, rather than to update it. In fact, judged against the broad sweep of subsequent events, its projection of likely developments in Zimbabwe, and the tasks for Zimbabwean workers, youth and peasants, has stood the test of time.
At the same time, in one respect at least, events have served to highlight more sharply a crucial determining factor in Zimbabwean perspectives. What has become clearer is that Zimbabwe forms the key target in the overall destabilisation strategy of the South African regime in Southern Africa.
Zimbabwe and SA imperialism
Of South Africa’s neighbours, Zimbabwe has the most developed industrial base. It is therefore more able to resist South African pressures, and to provide a potential counterweight around which other Southern African states can rally against the apartheid regime.
The elections early in March 1980 which brought Mugabe to power were followed within days by the formation of SADCC. These two events devastated the strategy of a ‘Constellation of Southern African States’ which Botha had put forward in 1979.
Despite Mugabe saying at that time that his government would not be directly involved in the struggle in South Africa, the ZANU(PF) victory and the relatively developed capitalist base placed Zimbabwe in the objective position of principal obstacle to South Africa’s imperialist ambitions.
The utopian plans of SADCC for the economic disengagement of the Southern African states would appear absolutely ridiculous if it were not for Zimbabwe’s participation. There is at least some limited scope for interlinking these economies around the axis of Zimbabwean industry, although that could not overcome the enormous preponderance of SA economic power.
Zimbabwean capitalism would like to take over domination of the Southern African market for itself. This (even to the limited extent it would proceed) is an objective basis of conflict between Zimbabwe and South Africa, despite the extensive penetration of Zimbabwe by South African capital.
Most of Zimbabwe’s foreign trade passes through South Africa. But the Pretoria regime cannot use this leverage in quite the same way as it squeezes or threatens Lesotho, Mozambique or Botswana—because SA’s own trade routes to Zambia and Malawi are heavily dependent on smooth passage through Zimbabwe.
There are features of an uneasy stand-off in relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa. There is a constant struggle—now more open, now more hidden—in which Harare strives to lessen South African pressure on it, especially in trying to develop or maintain alternative transport routes to those through the South African ports.
Inevitable confrontation
The inevitable confrontation between Zimbabwe and South Africa has been partly concealed by secret negotiations between security officials, by Mugabe’s outright support for the Nkomati Agreement, and by both sides realising how much damage they could inflict on each other.
For some time after Zimbabwe achieved independence it appeared that South Africa was forced to hold back from attempts to destabilise Zimbabwe. South African support for the ‘dissidents’ in Matabeleland was half-hearted; the Preferential Trade Agreement with Zimbabwe was renewed regularly; and the secret security talks continued.
At that time it was important to stress that the prospect of revolution at home would force the apartheid regime to lash out wildly and make “peaceful relations between the two countries impossible”.
It is now clear that a key element in the South African destabilisation strategy has been to undermine Zimbabwe’s potential leadership role in the region by forcing its trade through South African ports.
Once this is clearly grasped it becomes easier to see why South Africa continued to give active support to MNR counter-revolutionary banditry in Mozambique despite all the concessions made to Botha by Samora Machel in the 1984 Nkomati Agreement.
Despite incidents such as the military attack on Harare in May this year and the provocation of holding up transport at the Beit Bridge border in August, the main direct thrust of South African aggression against Zimbabwe remains within Mozambique.
The Botha regime’s policy of further weakening the FRELIMO government through maintaining or increasing the pressure of the MNR has a central aim: to try and ensure that all Zimbabwean trade through Maputo will have to go via South Africa and that the Beira line to the sea will never be secure.
This policy has succeeded to the extent that Zimbabwean trade through Mozambique has been reduced from 54% in 1983 to 5% in 1986. This has occurred despite the higher freight charges through South Africa, and despite Zimbabwe’s efforts in support of the FRELIMO government against the MNR.
South African destabilisation policies have succeeded in making SADCC states now more dependent on South Africa than in 1980.
Mugabe has responded to the process of slow strangulation by sending in troops to defend the Beira line and by launching a diplomatic offensive to raise funds for the ‘Beira corridor’.
He and FRELIMO have succeeded in getting the British and US governments to support the rehabilitation of the Beira and Nacala-Malawi railway lines. In the case of the Thatcher government this support includes important military assistance to FRELIMO.
On an issue such as the Beira line the policies of British and US imperialism and those of the Botha regime can diverge.
The Western imperialist powers are concerned to stabilise Southern Africa for capitalism; South African imperialism to destabilise and weaken Southern African resistance to its domination. London and Washington would like to see a capitalist counter-weight in Southern Africa to act as a pressure for reform on the Botha regime; Pretoria wants no obstacles to its freedom of manoeuvre and repression at home or in the region.
The Western powers are concerned lest SA pressure on the SADCC states induces them to turn towards the USSR and Eastern Europe. Last, and not least, the big capitalist powers are out to secure the Southern African markets for themselves.
The SADCC leaders base their whole strategy on trying to exploit these divergences in policy between the different imperialisms. But this cannot provide the way forward for the development of Southern Africa.
Already South Africa and Zimbabwe are engaged in a proxy war in Mozambique. Mugabe has announced after the death of Samora Machel that he will not tolerate the MNR coming to power; South Africa’s puppet ‘declared war’ on Zimbabwe in response.
As a commentator recently wrote: “The MNR’s declaration of war has effectively widened the range of options that Pretoria has at its disposal”. (Financial Times, 30 October 1986). This ‘declaration of war’ would be a joke were it not for South Africa’s backing and the frequent MNR attacks on the Beira line.
Facts of SA power
The South African generals have the power to cripple the Beira line at almost any time if they feel decisive action is needed. These are the facts of South African power, and Zimbabwean and Mozambican workers and peasants can put no trust in the tactical divisions between Western imperialism and the Botha regime.
An effective defence against South African aggression, which the workers and youth are striving towards, demands new methods.
Zimbabwean youth and workers in the townships, factories, schools, villages, mines, and farms, should be armed to repel any South African incursion. This would also free larger sections of the army to engage against the South African sponsored MNR and defend the Mozambican revolution.
But the ultimate guarantee of success against the counter-revolution is not by military means alone. What is needed is the elimination of the breeding grounds of support for, or passive submission to, the MNR—in the starvation and destitution of the Mozambican peasantry which has yet to experience the benefits of the state control of the economy.
Zimbabwe is in an excellent position to repay the debts of gratitude incurred during the liberation struggle. The granaries are full to overflowing with maize which is desperately needed in Mozambique. Industry could be turned around to process raw materials from Mozambique. The textile industry in Zimbabwe, for example, has the capacity to clothe the whole population of Southern Africa apart from South Africa. Simple spare parts and consumer goods could be supplied on a cooperative basis.
But the productive forces in Zimbabwe can only be directed to the social and military tasks of defence against counter-revolution if the capitalist grip on the banks, monopolies, and farms is broken and industry reorganised by the workers and peasants on the basis of a national and regional plan.
A Socialist Federation of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, in short, is the only effective answer to counter-revolution.
Political direction
These fundamental tasks of the Southern African revolution raise the question of which direction the Mugabe government is taking. As explained in the document, the most productive land is still in the hands of white capitalist farmers, and the ownership of the factories and mines by the monopolies remains unchanged.
Although there is a black government and civil service, this state fundamentally defends capitalist interests against the demands for change by the workers, peasants, and youth.
None of the tasks of the Zimbabwean revolution have been carried through to completion on the basis of capitalism. Although white minority rule has been ended, what democratic freedoms were achieved after independence are now under threat.
Yet the leadership does everything in its power to deny the reality that the capitalists dictate their policies. All the policies of the Mugabe government, including (for example) cuts in the state budget, are carried out in the name of socialism! But calling capitalist policies “socialist” does not solve the problems of the masses. Rather, it ends up discrediting socialism.
A large state bureaucracy is growing in Zimbabwe which extols the virtues of Stalinist regimes such as the USSR, China, Eastern Europe and North Korea. What in reality they admire in these regimes is the privileged life-style of the ruling bureaucracies which have a basis of ability unmatched in the crisis-ridden capitalist countries especially of the ‘Third World’. That ‘stability’ has been established on the advantages of state ownership and economic planning, and is maintained through so-called “Marxist-Leninist” party apparatuses—which rule by totalitarian methods.
In Zimbabwe, the ‘socialist’ bureaucracy models ZANU(PF) in this way in order to maintain its privilege, not on the basis of the state ownership and planning of the economy, but by defending capitalism!
This leads to bizarre contradictions. Thus, although both ZANU(PF) and ZAPU have declared their parties “Marxist-Leninist”, one of the ZANU(PF) leaders, Nkala, recently admitted that “debate is in full blast within ZANU(PF) whether or not socialism is the best ideological path for Zimbabwe”. (Prize Africa, December 1985)
Because of the contradiction between ‘socialist’ policies and capitalist reality we have a “Marxist-Leninist” party which is not sure whether it is committed to socialism! This means that at least a section of the bureaucracy favours openly abandoning even the pretense of ‘socialism’, in order the better to get on with enriching itself.
These glaring contradictions produce doubts and scepticism in the minds of the masses and a growing political crisis within the leadership.
Developments on the lines are predicted in the document. However, it even understated the absurdity with which they are working themselves out.
“Adopted capitalism”
In June this year, one of the top leaders of ZANU(PF), Maurice Nyagumbo, was forced to admit that Zimbabwe did not have a socialist government “as we now appear to have adopted capitalism, become property owners, and appear to be deceiving our people.” (Guardian, 7 June 1986)
Admitting that he had bought a large farm after independence, but had recently soId it, he even proposed that there should be an emergency conference of ZANU(PF) at which the rank and file should decide whether to replace the leadership.
Nyagumbo did not, however, reveal what he had done with the proceeds from the sale of his farm. Moreover, such are the doubts about the leaders that the workers and youth were not at all surprised to hear nothing more about his astonishing proposal for a conference!
Rather than representing the emergence of a serious socialist left-wing, such outbursts have everything to do with bureaucratic rivalry. Hardly beneath the surface, as the document points out, are the struggles between the different Shona regional overlords in ZANU(PF).
Less than two months before the ‘admission of guilt’ by Mugabe’ s favourite, this wag confirmed when the regional and tribal tensions within ZANU(PF) exploded in parliament.
Ushewokunze, then Minister of Transport and political commissar of ZANU(PF), responded to criticisms of his political and business dealings by launching a diatribe against his political enemies within the party.
In the past identified as a ‘left’ and calling for the formation of Marxist study circles, this leader now accused the Shona Karanga clan of planning to “pounce on me and kill me”, just as (he alleged) they had killed Chitepo, a leader of the guerrilla struggle. The Karangas considered him “a spanner in the works in their jockeying for tribal political control” and had constantly plotted his downfall, he said.
The filth of nepotism, corruption, and mismanagement in the ZANU(PF) government revealed by both sides in the affair brought disgrace to the leadership as a whole. For a time the government was virtually paralysed by the sordid controversy.
Faced with this, Mugabe has sought to maintain his reputation by levering himself above the daily cut and thrust of politics. He increasingly projects himself as a world statesman concerned with the leadership of the Third World and its diplomatic manoeuvres against apartheid South Africa.
The ZANU(PF)-ZAPU deal
The crisis of leadership has raised continual questions over the fate of the protracted unity talks between the ZANU(PF) and ZAPU leaders.
If agreement depended on the desires and ideas of the leadership, no deal would have been possible. The attitude of the ZANU(PF) leadership was shown in the statement of Ushewokunze, “We believe that everything is right in ZANU(PF) and, therefore, we see no need for concessions, compromise, and accommodation.” (Sunday Mail, 19 January 1986)
On the other side the ZAPU leaders, rather than fighting for socialist policies in a unified party, see the question as merely one of the ‘rightful role’ of Father Zimbabwe (Nkomo) and themselves in the privileged bureaucracy.
The deal has succeeded not because of what the politicians wanted, but because they have no alternative.
It is reported, for example, that Mnangagwa, the security minister in charge of the CIO, has been the leading advocate of the deal (behind closed doors, of course) after his eyes had been opened to the devastation of Mozambique by the South African-backed MNR.
As the Guardian correspondent commented: “A continuation of Zimbabwe’s tragic divisions would only give South Africa on a silver platter a ready-made dissident group with an ethnic base.” (17 April 1986)
It is this, and ZAPU’s retention of support in Matabeleland in the 1985 elections, which has advanced the discussions. As the document argues, Zimbabwean military involvement in Mozambique will become ever more demanding, making military suppression of Matabeleland an unattractive option for Mugabe.
Yet the deal will have to be a very poor thing, based on the division of party and government positions, rather than a determination to unite. While the ZAPU leadership is trying to let ‘bygones be bygones’ as they seek positions, the evidence of joint ZANU(PF)/ZAPU rallies shows that the Ndebele peasants want a real change.
At a rally earlier this year, Nkala, the former tormentor of Nkomo, was interrupted by the audience of Ndebele peasants who demanded that troops should be withdrawn from their area. (Prize Africa, May 1986)
Problems such as these will surface again and again even after the details of the unity deal are spelt out. Thousands of Ndebele workers, youth, and peasants, have been killed during the military repression since 1982.
In the future both party leaders will try to draw a curtain over the terrible facts of repression. As in the case of the bloody military dictatorships of Latin America, the ZANU(PF) leaders will argue they had to fight a ‘dirty war’ against terrorism and that any methods were justified.
But they had to undertake the bloody repression of Matabeleland because they were not prepared to undertake a socialist campaign to transform Zimbabwean society which would have undercut the dissidents.
As the price for their positions in government, the ZAPU leaders will remain silent on the torture and murders.
If the facts were known to the Shona workers and peasants—and if the revolutionary socialist alternative were understood—the government’s repression would be regarded as a national disgrace and a matter for deep shame.
But with the first flush of enthusiasm for the deal these issues will be side-stepped as both Shona and Ndebele workers and peasants welcome the easing of pressures to divide on tribal-national lines.
Previously Marxists had to argue that a deal was possible despite the lack of will by the petty bourgeois politicians. Now the opposite side of the coin will have to be stressed: that on the basis of capitalism the tribal-national divisions will open up with greater force in the future.
Genuine socialists will seize the opportunity of the pause in tribal-national chauvinism to raise the question of workers’ unity against the capitalists. It is vital that both Shona and Ndebele workers use this opportunity to initiate steps to develop class unity across regional divisions in the workplace and township.
These tasks can only be carried out if the workers unite to build the trade unions, independent of state control, against the policies of compromise and collaboration with capitalism of the bureaucracy in the trade unions and party, and give voice to the ideas of genuine socialism in the party as well.
Economic prospects
The document argues that the economic upturn of 1984-85 would peak in 1986 and then an economic decline would set in basically because of the shortage of foreign exchange.
This has now been confirmed. The most recent report of the Standard Bank (September 1986) talks of “formidable challenges over the next 18 months” during which adverse factors would predominate.
The 5-year development plan announced in April takes no account of the prevailing crisis in world capitalism, and the accumulating factors which will almost certainly produce a new recession or slump internationally, with serious consequences for Zimbabwe, in the period covered by the plan. Its targets, based on continued steady growth, cannot be taken seriously. The overall method of the plan is thoroughly dishonest—there is no balance sheet drawn up to compare what was targeted and what was achieved in the previous 3-year plan.
In all the key questions of economic and social life, in employment, housing, land resettlement, investment, etc, the targets of the first plan were sabotaged by the capitalists’ command of the economy.
In agriculture, for example, between 1980-85 there has been a decline of 7% in employment (100,000 jobs) despite the value of output rising by at least 50% over the same period. (Zimbabwe News, June 1985) While brick and other building material workers were retrenched, only 13,500 out of 115,000 houses targeted were built.
What progress was made was achieved at the expense of rising inflation and growing debts to local and international capitalists.
Increasingly Zimbabwe also faces the spillover effects of the general uncertainty of the capitalists in South Africa.
The economy is not only adversely affected by local factors, but increasingly hemmed in by the world market. Even in the course of the recent upturn in the US economy world commodity prices fell dramatically. With recession in the US, they will be likely to fall further.
In many countries of the under-developed world the costs of producing primary commodities are now well above the world prices particularly in sugar and tin, even though starvation wages are paid to the workers.
These factors apply equally to Zimbabwe and will tend to pull the economy into decline even if there is reasonable rainfall.
The coming of a world slump will devastate the economies of the former colonial countries and face the political leaders of these countries with the prospect either of watching whole industries disappearing or being forced to take emergency measures to bring the productive forces under state ownership.
The socialist opposition in the workers’ committees, trade unions, and party, face the challenge of preparing the workers and youth for these developments. Faced by such a crisis the working class will have to fight against all the gains of the past being removed, and will have to win the support of the peasants.
But for the working class to succeed a clear program showing the way forward is necessary. The Marxists will have to show how the crisis can only be overcome by the completion of that revolution; by the working class placing itself at the head of the nation against imperialism; by overthrowing capitalism and securing a democratic workers’ state.
This would then open the way to a plan of production, the expansion of manufacturing, and the real development of the country with an economy geared to the people’s needs, not profit. But within the national boundaries of Zimbabwe the limits of even this achievement would soon be clear—the revolution would have to spread for the gains to be continued and for a socialist society to be constructed.
Workers’ power in Zimbabwe would be a beacon to the workers and peasants of Africa struggling under the one-party dictatorships of capitalism. It would hasten the workers’ revolution in South Africa—the only sure defence of a democratic workers’ state in Zimbabwe from counter-revolution.
Workers’ democratic rule throughout Southern Africa would point the way forward to genuine regional cooperation, developing agriculture and industry, eliminating poverty, and laying the foundations for socialism.
10 December 1986